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Solving the Congressional Review Act’s Conundrum
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Abstract
Congress routinely enacts statutes that require federal agencies to adopt specific regulations.
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010,
for example, it mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopt an anticorruption regulation requiring energy companies to disclose payments they make to foreign
governments. Although the Dodd-Frank Act specifically required the SEC to adopt this disclosure
requirement, the agency’s eventual regulation was also, like other administrative rules, subject to
disapproval by Congress under a process outlined in a separate statute known as the Congressional
Review Act (CRA).
After the SEC issued its final disclosure rule as required under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress
passed a joint resolution disapproving the rule under the process authorized in the CRA. Although
that disapproval resolution nullified the SEC’s rule, it did not amend the Dodd-Frank Act nor
eliminate the statutory command that the SEC adopt a disclosure rule like the very one that Congress
had disapproved. Yet the passage of the CRA resolution did trigger a provision in the CRA that
prohibits an agency from adopting any subsequent regulation that is “substantially the same” as one
that Congress has disapproved. The SEC, in other words, still needed to issue a disclosure regulation,
but it could not issue one that was substantially the same as the old one.
In some instances, this might not pose a major problem for an agency, but the SEC found
itself in a bind because the Dodd-Frank Act not only required the agency to adopt a disclosure
regulation, the statute also provided considerable detail about what needed to be included in that
regulation. What emerged was a conundrum—the CRA conundrum—created by the tension between
the CRA and substantive statutes such as the Dodd-Frank Act. On the one hand, agencies face
statutory mandates to adopt regulations that comport with the detailed provisions of a substantive
statute, such as the Dodd-Frank Act. On the other hand, if these agencies’ regulations are then
disapproved, they can no longer adopt a regulation that is “substantially the same” as the old
regulation.
What is an agency to do? Is there a way for agencies to overcome the CRA conundrum,
remaining faithful to both the CRA’s “substantially the same” limitation and the detailed
requirements of a substantive statute that mandates regulatory action? In this article, I use the SEC’s
predicament to highlight and then tackle the CRA conundrum—one that other agencies have
confronted and will continue to confront in the future whenever CRA resolutions disapprove of
statutorily mandated rules.
The key to resolving the conundrum is to recognize that Congress’s choice of imprecision in
the CRA allows agencies to follow the more specific language contained in substantive statutes, such
as the Dodd-Frank Act. The test for substantial similarity in cases of statutory tension must be
measured against the discretion the substantive statute affords the agency. A general statute such as

the CRA, after all, can only impose obligations on an agency with respect to matters over which it
has discretion. An agency that finds itself facing the CRA conundrum simply needs to make sure that
any re-issued rule is no longer substantially the same as those portions of the rule over which the
substantive statute allowed the agency room to maneuver.
What counts as “substantial,” then, will necessitate an initial judgment about the space
available to the agency to act. Even with highly detailed statutory provisions, an agency will almost
always still have some discretion available to it over some of the rule’s terms. That discretion must
then be exercised in some substantially different way, even if only by making available opportunities
for waivers or by extending deadlines for compliance. In the end, the disapproval of a rule under the
CRA does not relieve an agency from its obligation to produce a regulation that complies with other
statutory obligations but, by viewing “substantial” from the proper perspective, the CRA conundrum
can be solved.

Solving the Congressional Review Act Conundrum
Cary Coglianese*
Congress routinely enacts statutes mandating that federal agencies adopt specific regulations.
When it passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, for example,
Congress required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt an anti-corruption regulation
that would compel energy companies to disclose payments they make to foreign governments.1 But
substantive statutes such as the Dodd-Frank Act must be implemented in accordance with more general
procedural statutes that govern the rulemaking process. And sometimes these procedural statutes can
come into tension with substantive statutes.
The Dodd–Frank Act specifically required the SEC to mandate that energy firms publicly
disclose information about their payments to government officials. That disclosure regulation was, like
any regulation, subject to a process outlined in a separate statute known as the Congressional Review Act
(CRA), which authorizes Congress to take steps to disapprove an agency regulation.2 In 2017, Congress
followed the process authorized in the CRA to pass a joint resolution that disapproved the SEC’s
disclosure rule.3 In doing so, Congress presented the SEC with a conundrum created by an apparent
tension between the CRA and the Dodd-Frank Act.
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That conundrum came about because, while Congress’s 2017 resolution of disapproval
nullified the SEC’s disclosure rule, it did not amend the Dodd–Frank Act. It nevertheless did trigger a
provision in the CRA that prohibits an agency from adopting any future regulation that is
“substantially the same” as one that Congress has disapproved.4 As a result, the SEC still needed to
issue a regulation that would mandate energy companies disclose their payments to foreign
governments, but it could not issue one that would be substantially the same as the old one. Although
perhaps sometimes this might not pose a major problem for an agency, the two statutes placed the
SEC in what one SEC Commissioner aptly described as a “difficult situation”5 because the DoddFrank Act not only required the SEC to issue a disclosure regulation, it also provided considerable
detail about what the agency needed to make sure that regulation said.6
The SEC thus faced a “novel and complex” puzzle.7 On the one hand, the agency needed to
adopt a regulation that comported with the detailed provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act. But on the
other hand, it was prohibited under the CRA from adopting a regulation that would be
“substantially the same” as the old regulation. What was the agency to do? The SEC eventually
announced a proposal for a new disclosure regulation, Rule 13q-1,8 that differed in several ways
from the old one—thereby purportedly comporting with the CRA—but the proposed regulation also
appeared in important respects to be inconsistent with the Dodd–Frank Act’s requirements for how

4

5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on Resource Extraction (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/crenshaw-statement-resource-extraction.
6
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (obligating the SEC to promulgate final rules that “require each resource
extraction issuer to include in an annual report of the resource extraction issuer information relating to
any payment made by the resource extraction issuer [or a related entity] to a foreign government or the
Federal Government for the purpose of . . . commercial development”).
7
Crenshaw, supra note 5; cf. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES x (2014) (observing how
“unlocking the meaning of an unclear statute … is often much like trying to solve a puzzle”).
8
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522 (Jan. 15, 2020) (proposed
rule).
5
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the disclosure rule should be designed.9 To solve the CRA conundrum, did the agency need to
contravene one statute to comport with another?
A considerable corpus of legal commentary has focused over the years on the
Congressional Review Act.10 Other scholars have identified and grappled with the ambiguity
inherent in the CRA’s “substantially the same” limitation.11 But the conundrum created by the
CRA’s limitation in the face of substantive statutes mandating a regulation similar to one
disapproved by Congress has so far escaped attention, even though the problem has already arisen
for agencies such as the SEC and will continue to arise in the future.12

9

See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
See Jody Freeman & Matthew C. Stephenson, The Untapped Potential of the Congressional Review
Act, 59 HARV. J. LEG. 279 (2022); Bridget C.E. Dooling, Into the Void: The GAO’s Role in the
Regulatory State, 70 AM. U.L. REV. 387 (2020); Keith Bradley & Larisa Vaysman, CRA Resolutions
Against Agency Guidance, 4 U. PA. J. L. & PUB. AFF. 459 (2019); Michael J. Cole, Interpreting the
Congressional Review Act: Why the Courts Should Assert Judicial Review, Narrowly Construe
“Substantially the Same,” and Decline to Defer to Agencies Under Chevron, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 53
(2018); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Trump Administration and the Congressional Review Act, 16 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 505 (2018); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 187 (2018); Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the
“Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word
(Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707 (2011); Sean D. Croston, Congress and the Courts Close
Their Eyes: The Continuing Abdication of the Duty to Review Agencies’ Noncompliance with the
Congressional Review Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 907 (2010); Julie A. Parks, Lessons in Politics: Initial Use
of the Congressional Review Act, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 187 (2003).
10

11

See, e.g., Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 710 (arguing that a rule will not be substantially the same
as a disapproved rule long as it has “a significantly more favorable balance of costs and benefits than the
vetoed rule”); Cole, supra note 10, at 83-94 (outlining seven possible approaches to interpreting
“substantially the same” and generally endorsing the approach taken by Finkel and Sullivan).
12

On the continuing appeal of using the CRA to disapprove of rules, see Bethany A. Davis Noll &
Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23 (2019) (observing that the CRA
will remain “an attractive tool for a future administration with unitary party control of the presidency,
House, and Senate, which seeks to undo its predecessor’s regulatory policies”). The only other work of
legal scholarship that I have been able to identify that gives anything more than a passing reference to the
CRA conundrum simply discusses and cites approvingly my analysis here, which was previously issued
as a working paper. John C. Ruple & Devin Stelter, Charting a “Substantially Different" Approach to
Land Management Planning Following a Congressional Review Act Joint Resolution of Disapproval, 12
ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 84 (2021) (“We agree with Professor Coglianese that the prohibition against

3

Although the CRA conundrum looks intractable, it can be resolved. The CRA’s choice of
the imprecise word “substantially” invites reconciliation between the CRA and any seemingly
conflicting statutory demands. An agency can proceed by ensuring that those features of a new
regulation that remain within the agency’s discretion are not substantially the same as the old
rule. After all, a statute such as the CRA can only impose an obligation on an agency with
respect to matters over which the agency has a choice. The agency just needs to make sure that
any re-issued rule is no longer substantially the same in terms of portions of the rule over which
the agency can exercise its discretion. Even with highly detailed statutory provisions, an agency
nevertheless will still have some discretion available to it which can be exercised in a
substantially different way, even if only by, for example, extending deadlines for compliance or
making available opportunities for waivers.
To put the point more generally, any assessment of whether a subsequent rule is
“substantially the same” as an earlier disapproved rule must be made with reference to the
discretion the substantive statute affords an agency in designing the rule. A congressional
disapproval resolution under the CRA does not relieve an agency from its obligation to produce a
regulation that complies with other statutory obligations. Such a disapproval resolution does not
amend the substantive statute, nor does it eliminate the substantive statute’s requirement that the
agency adopt a rule that meets certain criteria or contains specified elements. What counts as a
substantial similarity or difference between two rules thus cannot be made simply by comparing
the rules on their face, completely divorced from the substantive statute’s mandate. When

issuing a rule that is ‘substantially the same’ as a previously disapproved rule is best understood in light
of agency discretion.”).

4

Congress has required an agency to adopt a rule that Congress later disapproves, the approach
that best respects both the statutory prohibition in the CRA and statutory requirement in the
substantive law is to look to see whether the agency has exercised its discretion in substantially
the same manner.
In Part I of this article, I elaborate the nature of the CRA conundrum, using the recent
predicament of the SEC as an illustration. Although this one agency’s predicament suffices for
the purpose of illustrating the CRA conundrum, other agencies have faced it or will face it in the
future.13 Having illustrated the predicament by reference to the SEC’s disclosure rule, I then
proceed in Part II to present a spatial account of regulatory discretion and show how it solves the
CRA conundrum. I explain why the appropriate measure of the similarity of a subsequent rule
must take into account the amount of discretion—that is, the decision-making space—available
to the agency in adopting it.14 Finally, in part III, I take up possible alternative arguments that
rely on Chevron deference and on the legislative history underlying a resolution of disapproval. I
show that these alternative accounts cannot dissolve the CRA conundrum. In the end, the
solution lies in the spatial understanding presented in Part II.
Ultimately, tackling the CRA conundrum is important not merely for resolving the
seeming uncertainty arising from a disapproved rule, especially given that the prospect of

13

The U.S. Department of Labor, for example, confronted a situation in which Congress disapproved a
rule under the CRA even though “the statute continues to require the Secretary to issue regulations”
addressing the very issue as the disapproved rule. U.S. Department of Labor, Federal-State
Unemployment Compensation Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,037, 53,037 (Oct. 4, 2019).
14
In fact, after I presented the analysis in this article to the SEC, in the form of a comment on its proposed
rule reissuing its disclosure rule after Congress’s disapproval, the SEC adopted the basic conceptual
framework provided here. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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continued use of CRA disapprovals looms in the future.15 It is also important because
examination of the CRA conundrum provides still more general insights to the kinds of
challenges of legal interpretation presented in era of growing and increasingly complex statutory
law.16 Today, as ever before, agencies and courts will confront apparent conflicts between
statutes and must find ways to reconcile them so that agencies can meet all the demands that
Congress has imposed on them.

I. The Dodd–Frank Act, Rule 13q-1, and the CRA Conundrum

The CRA conundrum is not just an intellectual puzzle. It has in fact arisen, and it poses
real-world challenges for regulatory agencies. To ground the conundrum in the reality
confronting agencies, I begin with a brief explication of the SEC’s predicament surrounding the
Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that the SEC establish a rule on the disclosure of energy
extraction firms’ payments to governmental entities. I then turn to the CRA itself and show how
Congress’s disapproval of the SEC’s disclosure rule, combined with the CRA’s “substantially
the same” limitation, create what I have called the CRA conundrum.

A. The SEC’s Implementation of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Rulemaking Mandate
In 2010, Congress enacted section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.17 This provision instructed the SEC to adopt a rule requiring detailed

15

Bethany Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Rollbacks Have Changed the Nature of
Presidential Power, REG. REV. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/03/16/davis-nollrevesz-regulatory-rollbacks-changed-nature-presidential-power/.
16
GUIDO CALABRESI, COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).; ROBERT KATZMAN, JUDGING
STATUTES (2014).
17
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1504, 124 Stat.
1376, 2220-2222 (2010).
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reporting of payments made by natural resource extraction companies to governmental entities, as
a way of addressing concerns about corruption in countries that are rich in natural resources, such
as oil.18 The statute’s language was detailed and specific. Through its approximately 800 words,
the statute directed the SEC, among other things, to issue a rule that accords with express statutory
definitions for integral terms, such as “payments” and “resource extraction issuers.”19
In response to the statutory mandate in section 1504, the SEC initially adopted a final rule
in 2012.20 The brief text of this initial version of Rule 13q-1 simply required resource extraction
issuers to file reports using the SEC’s Form SD (which stands for “specialized disclosure”).21
Form SD, in turn, required the disclosure of all payments made to the U.S. government or a
foreign government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals.22 Under the SEC’s rule, entities needed to file Form SD using the SEC’s EDGAR
portal, which makes filings publicly available.23 This initial version of the rule, however, was
subsequently vacated in 2013 by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia because the
court found the rule to be arbitrary and capricious due to its “denial of any exemption for
countries that prohibit payment disclosure.” The court also held that the SEC had erroneously
interpreted section 1504 to mandate public disclosure of all reports.24

18

15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2018). Although the animating purpose of this provision stemmed from concerns
about payments of bribes to officials in foreign governments, the statute and subsequent rule made clear
that it applied as well to payments made to the U.S. federal government.
19
Id. at § 78m(q)(2)(A).
20
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012).
21
Id. at 56,417.
22
Id. at 56,418. The rule provided an exception to disclosure for “de minimis” payments, defined as a
payment or a series of related payments of no more than $100,000. Id. at 56,419.
23
Id.
24
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2013).

7

On remand from the district court, the SEC issued a new rule in 2016.25 This version, like
the 2012 rule, required resource extraction companies to make disclosures using Form SD and
the EDGAR portal.26 Among the changes the SEC made to the 2012 version, the agency added a
provision designed to defeat schemes to evade the required disclosure and it authorized issuers to
seek permission to follow an alternate reporting regime or to obtain an exemption from the rule’s
disclosure requirements. It also indicated that, rather than making each company’s report public,
the SEC would merely make periodic public reports compiling the information disclosed under
the rule.27
This second iteration of the rule also met with resistance. Representatives of industry, as
well as members of Congress, complained that the rule imposed burdensome compliance costs
on energy firms.28 In 2017, Congress passed, and the president signed, a joint resolution
disapproving the rule29 under the procedures outlined in the CRA.30 Upon President Donald
Trump’s signing of the joint resolution of disapproval, the 2016 disclosure rule was null and
void.
Perhaps buoyed by the aphorism “the third time is the charm,” the SEC went to work yet
again to issue the rule called for by the Dodd-Frank Act. In January 2020, the agency proposed
yet another version of the rule.31 As before, the proposed rule would require the submission of
25

Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 (Jul. 27, 2016).
Id. at 49,426-27.
27
Id.; see also Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522, 2525
(proposed Jan. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b) (summarizing similarities and
differences between the 2012 and 2016 rules).
28
See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H.848 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Rep. Hensarling); 163 CONG.
REC. H.852 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Rep. Barr).
29
See Pub. L. No. 115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (2017).
30
5 U.S.C. § 801–808 (2018).
31
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522 (proposed Jan. 15, 2020) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
26
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payment disclosures and, in other respects, it would keep many of the features of the 2016 rule.32
But it would also make some changes too. Specifically, the new version of the rule, as proposed,
would have expressly exempted from the rule’s disclosure requirements all resource extraction
issuers for whom providing the information would be “prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction”
where the projects are located or would violate any of the issuer’s preexisting contracts, as long
as certain conditions were met.33 The proposed rule would also broaden the “de minimis”
exemption and allow exemptions for small companies and those firms going through initial
public offerings.34 Perhaps most significantly, the proposed rule would allow issuers to aggregate
all payments of a particular type made to a level of government and disclose just the aggregated
amount.35
B. Congressional Oversight and the Creation of the CRA Conundrum
In proposing a new rule after its 2016 rule had been disapproved by Congress, the SEC
found itself facing the CRA conundrum. Under the CRA, a rule that is disapproved no longer has
any legal force or effect.36 Furthermore, the agency that adopted the disapproved rule is

32

Id. at 2567. Under the proposal, though, firms’ disclosures would only need to be furnished to the SEC,
rather than filed publicly.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 2570-71; see also id. at 2527-28 (summarizing changes made to the 2016 rules).
36
For instance, the entirety of the joint resolution of disapproval of the SEC resource extraction payment
disclosure rule reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission relating to “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction
Issuers” (published at 81 Fed. Reg. 49359 (July 27, 2016)), and such rule shall have no
force or effect.
131 Stat. at 9. This language follows the required template for such a disapproval resolution in the CRA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).
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precluded from issuing the same rule in the future.37 The relevant provision of the CRA—
Section 801(b)(2)—reads as follows:
A rule [disapproved under the CRA] may not be reissued in substantially the same
form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued,
unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the
date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.38
As the SEC noted in the preamble to its proposed rule, the CRA does not explicitly denote what
the phrase “substantially the same” means.39 Moreover, no court has yet been presented with the
occasion to construe these words in the CRA.40
Discerning the meaning of “substantially the same” is pivotal to resolving the CRA
conundrum. As the SEC correctly acknowledged in the preamble to its 2020 proposed rule,
notwithstanding the CRA disapproval of the 2016 version of the disclosure rule, the agency still
37

5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). Unlike with the district court’s nullification of the SEC’s 2012 rule which
emanated from the order issued by the judge, the preclusion of the 2016 version stems from the CRA,
rather than from any language within Congress’s 2017 joint resolution of disapproval. Except for the most
general heading that references “chapter 8 of title 5” of the U.S. Code, a heading that is not itself part of
the enacted law, the joint resolution itself contained no language whatsoever about any limitations on the
SEC’s ability to adopt a subsequent administrative rule on the disclosure of payments by resource
extraction issuers. See 131 Stat. at 9.
38
5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
39
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522, 2526 (proposed Jan. 15,
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b) (“The CRA does not define the phrase ‘substantially the
same’ . . . .”).
40
It may not be immediately clear whether a court could ever be confronted with this question, as a
precedent question is whether any suit for noncompliance with the CRA would be barred by section 805
of the CRA, which states that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be
subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 805. Presumably, this limitation on judicial review would not bar a
court from enforcing the CRA’s prohibition on the issuance of a subsequent rule that was “substantially
the same,” because judicial review in such a case would be of an action based on the substantive statute,
not one arising “under” the CRA. Moreover, consistent with this conclusion, federal courts have in fact
entertained CRA-based challenges to agency actions. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313
F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Alaska 2018); United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20936 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
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faced a statutory obligation to adopt a rule that both implemented section 1504 of the DoddFrank Act and complied with that substantive law’s detailed provisions.41
But with its proposed rule, the SEC also appeared to be proposing modifications to its
2016 rule that conflicted with the Dodd–Frank Act, as several commenters on the proposed rule
pointed out. In its approach to the question of whether disclosed payments can be aggregated, for
example, the SEC’s proposed rule appeared to conflict with the express terms of the Dodd–Frank
Act, which calls for disclosure of “any payment”—not disclosure of an aggregated amount of
payments.42 In addition, some commenters questions whether the SEC possessed the legal
authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to enact some of the exemptions the proposed rule would
allow.43 In addition, the agency arguably would come into some tension with the Dodd-Frank
Act with its proposed new definition of what constitutes an energy “project” that needs to be
disclosed, with the proposed rule taking a looser approach that allowed for multiple activities to
be treated as a single collective project.44 The ability to aggregate payments across projects, as
well as over time in single jurisdictions, would make disclosure less granular and thus allow

41

The SEC stated that “[a]lthough the joint resolution vacated the 2016 Rules, the statutory mandate
under Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act remains in effect. As a result, the Commission is statutorily
obligated to issue a new rule.” Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. at
2526.
42
See Oxfam America and EarthRights International, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 13q-1, at 30-31
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-19/s72419-6984657-214635.pdf; Susan RoseAckerman, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 13q-1 (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s724-19/s72419-6911526-211213.pdf; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2018).
43
See Elise J. Bean, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 13q-1, at 8-9 (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-19/s72419-7135311-216167.pdf; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 42;
cf. Daniel Farber et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 13q-1, at 2 (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-19/s72419-6960389-212777.pdf.
44
See Joseph Kraus, The ONE Campaign, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 13q-1, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-19/s72419-6996927-214761.pdf; Oxfam America, supra note 42,
at 30-41; Kathleen Brophy, Publish What You Pay, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 13q-1, at 36-40
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-19/s72419-6961610-212816.pdf.
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energy companies greater ability to hide bribes and other improper payments to foreign
officials—in direct contradiction to the purpose of section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
In seeking to comply with one statute—the CRA—the SEC proposed a new rule that may
have diverged too drastically from its prior rule and, in doing so, failed to conform to the text and
purpose of another statute—the Dodd–Frank Act. Instead of solving the CRA conundrum, what
the SEC proposed would have crashed directly into it.

II. Solving the CRA Conundrum

Agencies need a solution to the CRA conundrum. How can they keep from adopting a
rule that is “substantially the same” as a disapproved rule when a substantive statute has clearly
mandated that agencies adopt rules along the lines of those that Congress has subsequently
disapproved? To solve the CRA conundrum, agencies need to have a clearer understanding of
how much modification the CRA compels them to make if they seek to reinstate one of their
rules that has been disapproved. The answer, as will become evident, lies in how the words
“substantially the same” should be understood. These words, like many words in statutes that
must be interpreted, cannot be assessed in the abstract. They need to be understood in the context
of an administrative agency that is carrying out responsibilities authorized, and sometimes
dictated, by other statutes. The key to resolving the CRA conundrum lies in situating the
assessment of what is “substantially the same” by looking at the facets of the rule over which the
agency had discretion. In this Part, I will show that the test under the CRA is whether the
discretionary facets between two rules are substantially similar.

12

If one were to approach the CRA’s “substantially the same” provision just in the abstract,
the challenge for an agency would be similar to those that arise whenever statutes contain highly
ambiguous language. The word “substantially,” after all, evinces no bright line.
Consider an agency that issues a hypothetical rule that consists of, say, 100 words. If that
rule were disapproved under the CRA and the agency subsequently issued a new rule that
contained the same 100 words in identical order, the new rule would not only be substantially the
same—it would be exactly the same. But what if the new rule eliminated one word? It would still
seem rather obviously to be “substantially the same” as the original 100-word rule that had been
disapproved. Yet exactly how many words would need to be eliminated, added, or changed
before the new rule would no longer be “substantially the same” as the rule that had been
disapproved? Would ten words need to be changed? 20? 60? 70?
Other questions could be asked about a hypothetical 100-word rule. Suppose an agency
changed all 100 words but the new rule retained the same meaning—that is, it still obligated the
same individuals or entities to undertake or avoid the same actions. Would this new rule no
longer be “substantially the same” as the old one simply because the words were different but the
meaning was the same? Or what if the new rule imposed different obligations on different
individuals or entities but still was expected to achieve the same overall benefits to society and
impose the same overall costs?
The text of the CRA does not provide answers to these questions. More importantly,
when it comes to the CRA conundrum, the text does not offer any answer either to what an
agency should do in the face of a competing command from another, substantive statute that
requires it to adopt a rule along the lines of one that Congress has disapproved. The risk that
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agencies will face such competing commands is great in the modern era where so much law is
grounded in statutes and executed via the adoption of administrative rules—many of which
agencies are compelled by substantive statutes to adopt. The Dodd–Frank Act, for example,
contains explicit provisions requiring agencies, including the SEC, to adopt nearly 250 specific
rules.45
In these circumstances, when an agency is obligated to create a particular rule by another
statute and yet Congress disapproves such a rule under the CRA, the CRA conundrum calls out
for resolution.46 That resolution is actually facilitated by the very imprecision of the CRA’s use
of the word “substantially.” That ambiguity is a feature, not a bug, for it implies that the CRA is
not intended to impose a rigid restriction on an agency.
Congress was clear that a CRA disapproval resolution does not alleviate an agency’s
obligation to comply with another legal requirement that an agency adopt a rule similar to the
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DAVIS POLK, SUMMARY OF THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at i (July 21, 2010),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf (“By our count, the Act requires 243 rulemakings
. . . .”).
46
An agency might, of course, permissibly modify an earlier construction of ambiguous aspects of the
substantive statute. A new agency interpretation of any such ambiguous provisions in the substantive
statute might well prove reasonable and entitled to deference, even when its earlier interpretation was also
reasonable and entitled to deference. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”). By revising its
interpretation of such ambiguous provisions, the agency may be able to make its post-disapproval rule
substantially different than its pre-disapproval rule. This would be another way of giving effect to both
statutes, but this possibility amounts to a retreat from the assumption underlying the analysis in this
article: namely, that the CRA and the substantive statute are in tension. To the extent that the substantive
statute can be reinterpreted to eliminate that tension and to allow the agency room to make what would
colloquially be deemed a substantially different rule, then there really would be no CRA conundrum
presented.
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one disapproved.47 The text of the CRA expressly contemplates that other statutes impose
rulemaking requirements on agencies, and it makes clear that a resolution of disapproval does
not repeal those requirements. It does so in Section 803, which provides a “special rule” on
statutory deadlines, expressly extending by one year after a disapproval resolution’s enactment
any substantive statute’s deadline for promulgating a rule.48 Section 803 would not have been
needed if Congress had intended a resolution of disapproval to be construed as a repeal of a
substantive statute’s requirement to promulgate a rule.
Furthermore, it is a longstanding, firmly entrenched principle of statutory interpretation
that repeals of statutes should be stated expressly. As early as 1814, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that repeals by implication are disfavored.49 Yet a CRA resolution of disapproval must
comport exactly with sparse language provided for such resolutions in the CRA statute itself—
none of which even remotely expresses any affirmative intent to repeal provisions of another
statute.50 The operative language in a CRA resolution of disapproval just states that Congress
“disapproves the rule … and such rule shall have no force or effect.”51
The Supreme Court has described the general presumption against implied repeals as a
“cardinal rule,” stating that “[w]here there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be
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On obligation alleviation, see Cary Coglianese, Obligation Alleviation During the COVID-19 Crisis,
REG. REV. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/20/coglianese-obligation-alleviationduring-covid-19-crisis/; Cary Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler, & Daniel E. Walters, Unrules, 73 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming June 2021).
48
5 U.S.C. § 803 (2018).
49
Hartford v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 109, 109 (1814) (“[A] repeal by implication ought not to
be presumed unless from the repugnance of the provisions the inference be necessary and unavoidable.”).
50
The CRA specifies the precise terms that are to appear in a joint resolution of disapproval that is
eligible for the CRA’s special legislative procedures and triggers other facets of the CRA. 5 U.S.C. §
802(a). For the actual text of the joint resolution disapproving the SEC’s 2016 rule, see supra note 36.
That joint resolution comports with §802(a).
51
5 U.S.C. § 802(a).

15

given to both if possible.”52 It has explained that, “[i]n the absence of some affirmative showing
of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the
earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.”53
But even if the CRA were to be viewed as in hopelessly irreconcilable conflict with
another statute, this does not mean that others statute’s provisions must give way. Returning to
the Dodd-Frank Act by way of illustration, even if there existed an irreconcilable difference
between that Act and the CRA, it would be the Dodd-Frank Act that would impliedly repeal any
application of section 801(b)(2) of the CRA. This conclusion follows directly from two other
longstanding, well-accepted principles of statutory construction. First, specific statutes (such as
the Dodd–Frank Act) take priority over general statutes (such as the CRA).54 Second, later
statutes prevail over earlier ones.55 The Dodd–Frank Act was enacted in 2010, while the CRA
was adopted in 1996—meaning that, if the provisions are assumed irreconcilable, then the
Dodd–Frank Act’s provisions prevail.
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Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“In the absence of some affirmative showing of an
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and
later statutes are irreconcilable.”); see also, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (“We have repeatedly stated . . . that absent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals
by implication are not favored.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
54
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) (“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of
enactment.”); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998) (noting that “it would be
anomalous to conclude that Congress intended the priority statute to impose greater burdens on the citizen
than those specifically crafted”).
55
Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000) (explaining
that “a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control our construction of the [earlier]
statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly amended.”) (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523
U.S. at 530-531); see also Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)
explicating the “well-settled” principles that “[w]here provisions in … two acts are in irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one” and that
“if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act”).
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Admittedly, the resolution of disapproval comes last of all, after the enactment of the
Dodd–Frank Act. But disapproval resolutions themselves do not contain any prohibition on the
adoption of a substantially similar rule; only the 1996 CRA does.56 If any irreconcilable conflict
were to arise between the CRA and a statute mandating the adoption of a rule, it would only be
because of section 801(b)(2) of the CRA—the more general statute and, presumably in almost all
cases, the later one too57—not because of any provision in the disapproval resolution.
All this said, there exists no reason to assume an irreconcilable conflict between any
substantive statute and the CRA. This is because the phrase “substantially the same” is flexible
and can and should be construed in a way that gives effect to both the CRA and the substantive
statute underlying a disapproved rule. The way to reconcile the two statutes is to recognize that
what constitutes substantial similarity under the CRA depends on the degree of discretion
afforded to the agency under the substantive statute.
To see how this is so, let us return to the hypothetical example of a 100-word rule that
has been disapproved by Congress under the CRA. Let us further assume for the sake of analysis
that 70 of those words—the precise words themselves—had been expressly dictated by a
substantive statute obligating an agency to issue the rule. How should a new rule that follows a
disapproved one be judged if it contains those same 70 words but makes considerable changes to
the 30 words that were not required by the substantive statute? Taking the overall 100 words into
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See supra note 36. Again, the language in a disapproval resolution must accord with the exact language
the CRA expressly specifies for such a resolution—none of which states or even implies anything about
the “substantially the same” limitation.
57
Most statutes mandating the adoption of specific rules call for these rules to be adopted within a limited
timeframe of generally less than a few years after the passage of the statute. At this point in time, given
that the CRA was adopted nearly thirty years ago, any agency rules being adopted now in response to a
statutory mandate will almost certainly be at the behest of statutes adopted after the CRA.
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account, perhaps it might seem as if the new rule is still substantially similar to the old,
disapproved rule, as 70 percent of the words are identical to the old rule. But that cannot be the
correct conclusion, as it would imply that the CRA has repealed the substantive statute that
required those 70 words—a result which, as already noted, also cannot be the correct conclusion
under well-accepted statutory interpretation principles.
The better conclusion is that the agency, having genuinely changed its approach in the
portion of the rule over which it had discretion (that is, the 30 remaining words), acted in a
manner faithful both to section 801(b)(2) of the CRA and to the commands within its underlying
substantive statute. In fact, this is not only the better conclusion about how to construe the words
“substantially the same” in the CRA; it is the only possible way to understand these words in the
context of other constraining substantive commands on an agency imposed by other statutes.
To return to the SEC’s resource extraction disclosure rule, it is now possible to see how
this helps resolve the CRA conundrum in a real-world setting. Given the specificity and detail in
section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank Act—such as its requirement that an SEC rule mandate
disclosure of “any payment”58—the SEC found itself in a position not at all unlike the
hypothetical statute that compels the use of 70 percent of the words in a rulemaking. It could not
alter its rule to require disclosure of only some payments, nor merely to mandate disclosure of an
overall payment amount. It had to require disclosure still of “any payment,” as that statutory term
constrained the SEC’s discretion.
I do not claim, of course, that it is possible to quantify the level of discretion left to the
SEC in developing its Rule 13q-1 in numerical form. Nevertheless, it is clear that the SEC has
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See supra notes 6 and 42 and accompanying text.
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much less discretion over the contents of its resource extraction payments rule than it would have
under, say, a rule adopted under a more general authorization to create rules as “may be
necessary or appropriate,”59 sweeping language of a kind not infrequently found in statutory
authorizations of rulemakings.60
Every agency-promulgated rule will have multiple issues that need to be addressed or
different dimensions to be covered—the who, what, when, and how of rulemaking.61 In some
cases, as with section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the substantive statute will dictate how some
of these issues or dimensions are to be addressed. In the case of the SEC’s Rule 13q-1, for
example, some of these issues or dimensions had also been effectively dictated by prior judicial
rulings, such as the district court’s decision on the earliest version of the SEC’s rule.62
When it comes to compliance with the CRA’s “substantially the same” limitation, the
interpretation that reconciles that limitation with the requirement of a substantive statute must
consider as unchangeable those parts of the rule that Congress has effectively written for the
agency by requiring that the agency include in its rule certain features, definitions, or provisions.
The task in determining whether a subsequent rule is “substantially the same” as a disapproved
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See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2018) (“The Commission shall have the authority to issue such rules
and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent
with the purposes of this section.”).
60
For additional examples, see Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1339, 1350-1351 (2017).
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The SEC’s preamble to its proposed rule seems to recognize as much when it refers to “the amount,
granularity, timing, scope of, and liability for, the required disclosures.” Disclosure of Payments by
Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522, 2527 (proposed Jan. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). For related but general discussions, see Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of
Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1863-1870 (2019); Cary Coglianese, Regulation’s Four
Components, REG. REV. (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.theregreview.org/2012/09/17/regulations-fourcore-components/.
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See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013).
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rule simply becomes one of assessing how similar the former rule is to the latter in those aspects
over which the agency has discretion.
The basic idea, in other words, is to think spatially about agency discretion. To make a
determination of whether two rules are “substantially the same” for CRA purposes, an agency
should first consider how much of the regulatory “space” the substantive statute has allowed the
agency to fill. The agency’s obligation under the CRA is then to make sure that any new rule that
follows a disapproved one is not substantially the same within the remaining space that the
substantive statute has left for the agency to fill.
If a statute gives an agency virtually unbounded space within which to design a rule—
say, by merely authorizing the agency to adopt a rule that is “appropriate and necessary” or that
simply advances the “public interest”—then it will be appropriate to compare a new rule with a
disapproved rule one on virtually every dimension. In such a situation, determining whether two
rules are substantially can be conceived as basically calling for the use of the “compare
documents” function on Microsoft Word to see how many words are different between the two
rules. But if a statute gives much less direction to an agency, and actually spells out features and
provisions that a rule must contain, then the appropriate test of similarity demands first putting to
the side those facets of the relevant agency rules that are mandatory and then comparing what is
left. One might even say that, if a statute already fills up half of the proverbial décor in a
regulatory “room,” the test under the CRA is to compare what the agency has done in terms of
decorating the room’s other half.
For an agency such as the SEC, then, this spatial understanding of regulation means that
it should not, cannot, and, more notably, need not violate the Dodd-Frank Act in an effort to
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make a subsequent rule sufficiently different from a disapproved one to comport with the CRA.
The SEC simply needed to ensure that its new resource extraction disclosure rule was
substantially different with respect to those facets of the rule over which the agency had
discretion.

III. On the Applicability of Chevron and Legislative History

What remains to be considered are two additional arguments for reconciling the demands
of a substantive statute such as the Dodd-Frank Act with the constraints of the CRA: Chevron
deference, and a reliance on legislative history. Perhaps what counts as “substantially the same”
should be analyzed using the Chevron framework—which would suggest that the very ambiguity
of “substantially” should lead courts to allow agencies to resolve these matters on their own. Or
perhaps the answers for how agencies should respond in the face of a CRA disapproval
resolution depends on mining the legislative history underneath that very resolution.
Although both of these alternative perspectives have emerged to varying degrees as
contenders in the quest for resolution of the CRA conundrum, neither are persuasive nor even
helpful in solving this puzzle of competing statutory dictates. The failings of these alternative
perspectives only reinforces that the conundrum’s resolution depends on the spatial
understanding of regulatory discretion articulated in Part II and on an assessment of similarity
within the context of how an agency has designed a new rule within its discretionary space.
A. Chevron Deference
As explained in Part II of this article, a spatial understanding of regulatory discretion
reasonably accommodates both the CRA and the Dodd–Frank Act. The very reasonableness of
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this understanding might lead some observers to want to invoke the framework articulated in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.63 After all, Chevron—which
remains good law, even if the Supreme Court seems to ignore it64—calls upon courts to defer to
agencies’ reasonable understanding of ambiguous statutory provisions. It might seem that few
statutory provisions could be more ambiguous than the CRA’s “substantially the same”
provision.65
The Chevron approach to resolving the CRA conundrum might actually take two subtly
distinct forms. The first form would simply use Chevron to bolster the spatial account developed
in Part II. In other words, applying this first form of the Chevron argument might merely imply
that an agency such as the SEC should receive deference if it were to adopt a spatial approach to
interpreting the CRA, given that the CRA’s “substantially the same” terms are ambiguous and
that the spatial understanding is reasonable.
A second, and more expansive, form of the Chevron argument would be to use it to make
the CRA conundrum disappear altogether. The conundrum comes about, this form of the
argument would go, only because of an ambiguity created by two statutes’ provisions being
seemingly at odds with each other. In the face of this ambiguity over the conflict between the
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Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837-866 (1984).
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Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Chevron Deference Still Alive?, REG. REV. (July 14, 2022),
https://www.theregreview.org/2022/07/14/pierce-chevron-deference/.
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Although still a standing precedent, Chevron’s future status remains an open question, as some
Supreme Court justices question the doctrine’s constitutionality and others have criticized or ignored it for
other reasons. If the Court should repudiate or abandon Chevron, that will obviously mean it cannot be
used to solve the CRA conundrum. But if Chevron deference does manage to survive, even if in limited
circumstances such as when relevant statutory provisions contain “broad and open-ended terms like
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Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153 (2016). They will just not be
persuasive arguments for the reasons provided in the text.
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two statutes, Chevron’s Step One would be satisfied. The argument would then be that the courts
should defer to the agency’s new rule as long as it is reasonable, as the new rule by definition
would reflect the agency’s resolution of the ambiguity created by the conflicting statutes.
Effectively, this is just a way of the courts saying, essentially, “don’t worry, be happy.”66 As
long as what the agency proposes to do in response to a disapproval resolution seems reasonable,
then any statutory ambiguity created by an apparent conflict with the CRA ’s “substantially the
same” should be enough to make the agency’s rule eligible for deference and for the courts to
allow it to proceed.
But under either form of the Chevron argument, a court would not be justified in giving
an agency deference in the face of ambiguity created by the CRA’s terminology. Chevron
deference is grounded on an implied delegation to an agency,67 and a general procedural statute
such as the CRA, which applies to agencies across the entire federal government, contains no
implied delegation to any individual agency.68 In the SEC example, even though Congress has
authorized the SEC to implement aspects of the Dodd–Frank Act, it has not delegated to the SEC
(nor to any other agency) the authority to construe ambiguous terms in the CRA nor to resolve
ambiguities created by the CRA’s terms. Chevron deference is simply not available to agencies
for their interpretations of procedural statutes generally applicable across the federal government,
no matter how reasonable those interpretations may be.69
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70 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 94-101 (2018) (arguing that the SEC cannot win Chevron deference for an
67

23

The issue of Chevron deference is thus largely a distraction. The spatial understanding of
“substantially the same” presented in Part II is not merely a reasonable interpretation of the CRA
in a setting where a statute has compelled an agency to adopt a specific rule. It is also the only
plausible interpretation that reconciles both the CRA and the substantive statute. A court would
need to adopt this view of the CRA at Chevron Step One and could not proceed to Step Two, as
that would imply that there exist alternative reasonable ways to resolve the CRA conundrum.70
The reality is that the spatial understanding in Part II is the only way to respond and fulfill the
long-held principle of statutory construction that when two statutes appear to clash, “effect
should be given to both [statutes] if possible.”71
Even if arguments urging Chevron deference were more convincing, such deference
could never sustain an agency position that construes the CRA’s “substantially the same”
provision in a manner that allows the agency to ignore mandatory terms of a substantive statute.
Such a direct conflict with a substantive statute could never be a reasonable one.
Furthermore, no court could give proper deference to an interpretation that a CRA
disapproval resolution had amended a substantive statute and released the agency from its
responsibility to comply with the latter statute’s requirements. Such a claim that a CRA
disapproval resolution amends or repeals a substantive statute would also never be reasonable.
The text of such a resolution of disapproval is stipulated by the CRA itself to read quite sparsely:

interpretation of a general statute such as the CRA); Arianna Skibell & Geof Koss, SEC Rule Repeal Sets
Stage for Unprecedented Legal Fight, E&E DAILY (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2017/02/10/stories/1060049856 (attributing a similar conclusion to the
author of this article).
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“That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the [agency] relating to [the rule being
disapproved], and such rule shall have no force or effect.”72 Nothing in a resolution worded this
way—as disapproval resolutions must expressly be worded under the CRA—appears in any
relevant way to be ambiguous. Nor is it possible to see how any interpretation of this text could
ever sustain a reasonable interpretation that another statute has been effectively amended or
repealed by such a resolution.
B. Legislative History
In the preamble to the SEC’s proposed rule in the resource extraction disclosure rule, the
agency looked to the legislative history of the joint resolution of disapproval for guidance as to
what its options may be for a subsequent rulemaking.73 Some of the SEC’s invocation of
legislative history was innocuous. For example, the SEC quite appropriately acknowledged that
even some members of Congress who voted for the disapproval resolution did so while
recognizing that the agency still needed to go back and follow the dictated elements of the
Dodd–Frank Act in issuing a new rule.74 More concerningly, though, the SEC elsewhere in its
preamble cited a problematic passage in the legislative history of the CRA itself, quoting part of
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5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2018).
For example, in its proposed rule, the SEC stated:
Given this legislative history, and the absence of further general guidance from the CRA
or specific legislative guidance from Congress addressing the form of a new rulemaking,
we looked to the concerns raised by members of Congress during the floor debates on the
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Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522, 2526 (Jan. 15, 2020); see also
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achieve an appropriate balance between implementing the statute as required by Congress and addressing
the concerns expressed by commenters and members of Congress.); id. at 2528 n. 78 (emphasizing that
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a flawed claim made by Senate sponsors of the bill that became the CRA.75 The flawed claim
suggested that the legislative history of a resolution of disapproval could be used to support an
agency taking a position on a new rule that would effectively modify or even repeal the relevant
substantive statute:
If an agency is mandated to promulgate a particular rule and its discretion in issuing
the rule is narrowly circumscribed, the enactment of a resolution of disapproval for
that rule may work to prohibit the reissuance of any rule. The authors intend the
debate on any resolution of disapproval to focus on the law that authorized the rule
and make the congressional intent clear regarding the agency’s options or lack
thereof after enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. It will be the agency’s
responsibility in the first instance when promulgating the rule to determine the
range of discretion afforded under the original law and whether the law authorizes
the agency to issue a substantially different rule. Then, the agency must give effect
to the resolution of disapproval.76
But clearly a resolution of disapproval in no way can work to “prohibit the reissuance” of a rule
that is mandated by another duly enacted statute. As already noted, disapproval resolutions must
follow a specific—and sparse—form specified in the CRA.77 Nothing in this sparse language
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The legislative history of the CRA consists mainly of a joint statement of Senate sponsors introduced in
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even remotely speaks to another statute at all, let alone could constitute a legislative repeal of
another statute’s requirement that an agency issue a regulation. Moreover, as noted earlier,
Section 803 of the CRA expressly contemplated that an agency which had faced a deadline to
issue a disapproved rule would still need to re-issue the rule.78
Just as the legislative history of the CRA provides no basis for concluding that a
disapproval resolution repeals or amends another statute, it would be problematic for an agency
to rely on any legislative history leading up to a disapproval resolution as a basis for implying an
amendment or repeal of another statute. Legislative history can be an aid in understanding a
statute and giving it meaning, but it is not the law adopted by Congress.79 Moreover, legislative
history needs to be at least connected to statutory law and used in service of giving meaning to it.
Because none of the words contained in a CRA disapproval resolution speak in any way to
amending or repealing another statute, any legislative history that may pertain to how an entirely
separate statute ought to be construed would be devoid of any connection to the disapproval
resolution. All the resolution does is remove the force and effect of a specific agency rule; it does
not speak at all to the statute underlying the disapproved rule.80
In the end, regardless of what might transpire in legislative deliberations leading up to a
resolution of disapproval, nothing in such a resolution could ever make legislators’ views about a
prior enacted law germane to an understanding of the actual resolution adopted. Contrary to what
the Senate sponsors of the CRA claimed in their joint statement, Congress simply cannot act
through a CRA disapproval resolution, or through statements in the legislative history leading up
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See, e.g., Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018) (“[L]egislative history is not the
law.”).
80
See supra notes 36 and 50 and accompanying text.
79

27

to such a resolution, to bypass the normal bicameral and presentment requirements to amend a
statute that requires an agency to promulgate a specific rule.81 If Congress wants to repeal or
change the parameters of a substantive statute’s obligation on an agency, it cannot do so via the
CRA process which is directed at administrative rules. It needs to adopt separate legislation
repealing or changing the substantive statute.

Conclusion

Until Congress repeals or amends a substantive statute that requires the promulgation of a
specific rule, an agency is bound to respect the statute’s requirements. And a court can be
expected to hold the agency to those obligations.
In the case of an agency such as the SEC, which faced both a substantive statute’s
obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act and a resolution of disapproval under the CRA of an
earlier version of a rule established to fulfill the agency’s obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act,
the disapproval resolution does not, as the SEC recognized, alleviate the agency’s underlying
substantive statutory obligations. That means that if the SEC is required under the Dodd-Frank
Act to adopt a rule compelling energy extraction companies to disclose publicly “any payment”
they make to governments, then it cannot propose an altogether different kind of disclosure
requirement merely to make its rule different from an earlier one that Congress disapproved.
An agency need not, and must not, violate its obligations under substantive statutes
mandating specific rules to comport with the CRA because, even when a rule is disapproved
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Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983) (holding that modification of a statute delegating
authority to an agency requires “bicameral passage [in Congress] followed by presentment to the
President”).
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under the CRA, there is a readily available and eminently sensible way of overcoming the CRA
conundrum. When a statute mandates that an agency adopt a rule, such Dodd-Frank did with
respect to Rule 13q-1, the question is not whether to assess “substantially the same” in the
abstract. Rather, those terms in the CRA must be understood by reference to the degree of
agency discretion that is afforded in the original, substantive statute. It is telling that, in the end,
when finalizing its proposed rule, the SEC articulated an understanding of “substantially the
same” that follows the analysis presented in this article. The SEC explicitly recognized the
principle that it cannot weaken a disclosure regime in contravention of requirements in the
Dodd–Frank Act, even if in the name of satisfying the CRA.82 Instead, the SEC stated that the
test for compliance with the CRA should be based only on the “central discretionary
determinations” the agency had made in its disapproved rule.83
In an era of increasing dependence on statutory law and administrative rulemaking, it is
important to make clear that agencies cannot use the CRA to expand their discretion by revising
aspects of a previous rule that they were required to fulfill the agency’s obligations under a
substantive statute. In circumstances where a substantive statute spells out in detail what a rule
must entail, an agency may still have some degree of discretion, if only to offer the possibility of
granting limited waivers or perhaps phasing in or otherwise delaying the date for compliance
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with a new rule. In such situations where agencies have been given virtually no other discretion
under a substantive statute as to the form and content of a rule, the inclusion of such a limited
exemption option or a delayed compliance date would suffice to satisfy the CRA by making the
subsequent rule substantially different in the relevant space of available agency discretion.85
A spatial understanding of what it means to be “substantially the same” holds the key to
reconciling the apparent conundrum created when a general procedural statute, such as the CRA,
comes into tension with the requirements of a more specific substantive statute, such as the
Dodd–Frank Act. Only under such a spatial approach, focused on an agency’s available
discretion, can the agency give due effect to its obligations under both the CRA and the
substantive statute.
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